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RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
Sadiq Reza*
It takes a special breed to have the understanding, compassion
and dedication to do what criminal defense lawyers do .... As
for public defenders - they are doing God's work. If Christ had
been a lawyer, he would have been a public defender.'
Virtually all public defenders fight a daily battle against burnout
and the creeping erosion of confidence that inevitably accompany
defending acts we cannot condone and protecting those who are
the source of so much harm and grief. . . . Whether the process
unfolds subtly or suddenly, all defenders must confront the dis-




Enlarged copies of the first quote above - yellowed, torn and
affixed with cellophane tape - adorn the office walls of many a
lawyer at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia.
The words inspire and exhort a cadre of already exceptionally com-
mitted attorneys to persevere in championing the cause of those
whom they represent: indigent adults and juveniles charged with
criminal offenses in Washington, D.C. The second quote, from a
revered veteran of that office, expresses a decidedly more sober
and earthly reality of public defender work. To be sure, defending
wrongdoers has ample precedent in Christianity and the other
Abrahamic faiths. Moses prevailed upon God to forgive the Israe-
lites for worshipping the Golden Calf;3 Jesus protected the adulter-
* A.B., Princeton University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991; Staff Attor-
ney, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, 1993-1997; Associate, Ar-
nold & Porter, Washington, D.C., 1997-present. I am indebted to all the participants
in the December 1998 symposium at Fordham University School of Law, "Redis-
covering the Role of Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent,"
and to all the fine scholarship in this area that preceded that symposium. I am espe-
cially grateful to Russell Pearce and Asifa Quraishi for inviting me to the symposium,
Azizah al-Hibri for help with Islamic sources, Nazish Agha for help with books, and
Abbe Smith, Tanina Rostain and Sami Ayish for comments.
1. Profile: Michael Karnavas, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1993, at 51.
2. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1267 (1993) [hereinafter Ogletree, Beyond
Justifications].
3. See Exodus 32:9-12 (New Revised Standard Version).
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ess from stoning despite her guilt;4 and Muhammad enforced
God's commandments to respect personal privacy, and thereby
suggested an exclusionary rule some fourteen hundred years
before that rule would epitomize the legal "technicality" in our
criminal justice system.
But lofty examples such as these do not answer the more mun-
dane, but crucial, questions raised by the day-to-day work of public
defenders. How "Christ-like" is it to cross-examine a witness
whose testimony is apparently both truthful and accurate, in an ef-
fort to discredit the witness and secure a client's acquittal? How
"Christian" is it to fight to block damning evidence against a client
from the eyes and ears of a jury, or to conceal unfavorable infor-
mation about a client from a judge, for the sake of a guilty client's
freedom? What part of "God's work" is it to argue against state
supervision of children who have been forsaken by family and
community and are clearly in need of help? How "religious" is it,
in other words, to use every lawful means available, indeed to push
the limits of lawfulness, to fight to wrest from state authority indi-
viduals who may be dangerous to society, to themselves, or to both,
or who may at least be involved in conduct that our laws deem
criminal?
Conventional justifications for public defender work are many
and persuasive. Emerging literature on the role of religion in lawy-
ering, meanwhile, challenges rules of professional conduct that re-
flect these justifications and sanctify what public defenders do.
Questions posed by the "religion and lawyering" movement in-
clude: whether an attorney should reveal client confidence when
called for by a greater societal good, for instance to protect an in-
nocent person from being executed;6 whether an attorney should
4. See John 8:3-11. For a legal analysis of this episode, see Thomas L. Shaffer,
Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1027-29 (1989)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Serve the Guilty?].
5. See 16 Sahih Muslim Bi Sharh al-Nawawi, vol. 8, at 118-19 (Dar Ihya' al-
Turath al-Arabi, reprint at Beirut, n.d.) (reporting Muhammad's injunction against
eavesdropping and spying); Osman Abd-el-Malek al-Saleh, The Right of the Individ-
ual to Personal Security in Islam, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 55, 70
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1982) (discussing episodes in which early Muslim leader
Umar ibn al-Khattab ignored wrongdoing he discovered by "spying"); Awad M.
Awad, The Rights of the Accused Under Islamic Criminal Procedure, in THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 91, 104 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1982) (same); Qur'an,
xlix:12 (A. Yusuf Ali trans., American Trust Publications 2d ed. 1977) ("[S]py not on
each other .... "); id., xxiv:27-28 ("0 ye who believe! Enter not houses other than
your own, until ye have asked permission and saluted those in them.... If ye find no
one in the house, enter not until permission is given to you ... .
6. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31.
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"conscientiously object" to actions on behalf of a client that contra-
vene the attorney's religious beliefs;7 and whether attorneys should
take a more active "moral" role in advising and representing cli-
ents.8 The court-appointed attorney is occasionally, but not rou-
tinely, distinguished from other attorneys in these discussions,
because of the relative powerlessness of clients who receive court-
appointed counsel and the need for their zealous representation.9
This Essay will argue that the public defender, or any other at-
torney appointed by the court to defend adults or juveniles charged
with criminal offenses, should not undertake, or fail to undertake,
any action to the legal detriment of a client on the basis of a con-
flict the attorney perceives between religious and professional im-
peratives, except in the rare case of imminent death or serious
bodily harm to another. This argument rests on the following four
premises: (1) the public defender occupies a unique position in our
legal system, and options that may be available to lawyers who
serve private interests or other clients cannot and should not be
available to him; (2) any deviation by a public defender from the
governing professional constraints (and exhortations) in represent-
ing a client that stems from conflicting religious beliefs and harms
the client would be both professionally unethical and immoral; (3)
religion is at best equivocal in addressing questions of the propriety
of specific actions taken or urged on behalf of clients; and (4) the
appropriate role of religion in the work of a public defender is that
of individual inspiration, or motivation to work to change the pro-
fessional code or the criminal justice system itself. Each of these
premises will be discussed in turn.
I. The Special Role Of The Public Defender
Case law, rules of professional conduct and legal scholarship uni-
formly recognize the special role of a criminal defense lawyer in
our system of justice. Thirty years before the Supreme Court de-
clared the right to counsel in criminal cases to be a fundamental
right in Gideon v. Wainwright,"° the Court spoke of the need for
defense counsel in order to protect the innocent.' Soon after
7. See infra text accompanying notes 23-36.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
9. See infra text accompinying note 44.
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
Left without the aid of counsel [the criminal defendant] may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evi-
dence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
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Gideon, Justice White clarified that criminal defense counsel also
must vigorously defend the guilty, even if that means withholding
incriminating evidence and attacking incriminating evidence coun-
sel knows to be true.'2 Rules of professional conduct reflect this
duty and protect counsel in fulfilling it. Rule 3.1 of the American
Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct
exempts criminal defense counsel from the prohibition against friv-
olously asserting or controverting issues.13 The ABA's Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice go further, ad-
vising criminal defense counsel that it is proper to discredit a truth-
ful government witness and that failing to do so could violate
counsel's duty to represent the client zealously.14 Scholarly com-
mentary supporting and explaining the special leeway for criminal
defense counsel abounds. Professor Richard Wasserstrom
presented some of this reasoning in an oft-cited article,'15 and nu-
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
Id.
12. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
[D]efense counsel has no ... obligation to ascertain or present the truth.
Our system assigns him a different mission... [W]e... insist that he defend
his client whether he is innocent or guilty .... Defense counsel need present
nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any wit-
nesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any
other information to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness,
even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indeci-
sive, that will be his normal course.... [M]ore often than not, defense coun-
sel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can,
even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth ....
Id.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1999) ("A lawyer
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established.") [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
14. See ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Stan-
dard No. 4-7.6 commentary (1993) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
15. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
A.B.A. HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975).
Because a deprivation of liberty is so serious, because the prosecutorial re-
sources of the state are so vast, and because, perhaps, of a serious skepticism
about the rightness of punishment even where wrongdoing has occurred, it is
easy to accept the view that it makes sense to charge the defense counsel
with the job of making the best possible case for the accused - without
regard ... for the merits ....
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merous commentators have expanded and refined the analysis. 16
Professor Monroe Freedman has for decades noted the special cir-
cumstances of criminal defense cases in his authoritative positions
on legal ethics, particularly on the vexing questions of client per-
jury and cross-examining the truthful witness.17 In essence, special
rules for criminal defense lawyers are seen as necessary to protect
against overreaching by the state and to enforce constitutional and
statutory protections for the benefit of the individual client and so-
ciety at large.18
These justifications are even stronger when applied to indigent
clients. Criminal defense counsel's duty to protect a client against
oppression by the state is heightened for clients who are disadvan-
taged socioeconomically and have no real choice of counsel. 19
16. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1729 (1993); Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 2, at 1244-59 (reviewing tradi-
tional "role morality," "client-centered" and "systemic" justifications for criminal de-
fense work); Kim A. Taylor, Reading Between the Lines: Indigent Defense Issues and
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 63, 66 (1993) [here-
inafter Indigent Defense Issues] ("In the development and analysis of rules of profes-
sional responsibility, it has long been recognized that criminal defense is . . .
different .... [Criminal] cases involve fundamental questions of liberty, and some-
times even life .... [T]he disparity of resources and power between the state and the
defense in a criminal case demands that the accused be afforded greater protection.");
Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensi-
tive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 46-50 (1993) (consider-
ing the traditional justifications from feminist and clinical education perspectives).
17. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics (1990) (in
particular chapters 6 and 8); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469
(1966).
18. See also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 60 (1988) ("[C]riminal defense
is a very special case [of lawyers' advocacy], in which the zealous advocate serves
atypical social goals.... The goal of zealous advocacy in criminal defense is to curtail
the power of the state over its citizens. We want to handicap the state in its power
even legitimately to punish us, for we believe ... that if the state is not handicapped
or restrained ... , our political and civil liberties are jeopardized. Power-holders are
inevitably tempted to abuse the criminal justice system.to persecute political oppo-
nents, and overzealous police will trample civil liberties in the name of crime preven-
tion and order. To guard against these dangers, we protect our rights in effect by
overprotecting them."); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional
Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L. J. 2419, 2426-27 (1996)
[hereinafter Taylor, Alternating Visions] (noting that the Supreme Court in the 1960s
"signal[ed] its expectation that criminal defense lawyers would uncover and raise
claims of constitutional violations"). But see William H. Simon, The Ethics of Crimi-
nal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (criticizing the categorical exemption of
criminal defense from critiques of the adversary system).
19. See, e.g., Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 2, at 1258-59 ("[F]ocus...
on the disempowered status of individuals represented by public defenders [provides]
the strongest of the theories offered to justify zealous advocacy [in criminal defense
work]."); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st
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Race- and class-based prejudices against clients further heighten
the duty.2" Similarly, justifications for advocacy itself take on ad-
ded meaning in the context of indigent criminal defense. Maximiz-
ing the "human dignity" and "autonomy" of a client and ensuring
the client's fair treatment at the hands of the law are seen as core
purposes of representation within the adversary system.21 Clients
already disenfranchised socioeconomically and in danger of further
alienation though criminal sanctions need the assistance of counsel
for dignity and autonomy all the more.22 The public defender thus
plays a unique role within the special arena of criminal defense
work.
H. Proposals for Deviating from Rules of Professional Conduct
on the Basis of Religious Values
Professor Thomas Shaffer has long suggested that a lawyer might
''conscientiously object" to actions on behalf of a client that offend
the lawyer's religious sensibilities.23 Professor Leslie Griffin now
presents "exemption" and "civil disobedience" as two options
available to the lawyer whose religious convictions conflict with ob-
ligations of the professional rules that govern lawyers' conduct.24
Under the "exemption" model, lawyers would be permitted to vio-
late professional rules to the detriment of clients with impunity,
Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 82-85 (1995) (discussing disparate economic
and racial impacts of the criminal justice system and consequently greater imperative
for assistance of counsel); Taylor Alternating Visions, supra note 18, at 66 (noting ad-
ded disadvantages of prejudices against poor and minority defendants in criminal jus-
tice system); Smith, supra note 70, at 47 ("Indigent criminal defendants have often
been victimized in countless ways themselves.").
20. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in
the Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 789 (1995) ("[T]he public defender's
clients are the epitome of the class of individuals that the public is convinced is the
cause of crime. Public defender clients are uniformly poor, mostly Black, and rou-
tinely perceived as social outcasts."); Taylor, Alternating Visions, supra note 18, at
2441 (noting "the negative presumptions that actors in the criminal justice system and
members of this society hold against poor people of color, who tend to be those
charged with crimes") (footnotes omitted); id. at 2468 (noting "the presumptions of
guilt that attach because of class and race") (footnote omitted).
21. See Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17, at 39-48.
22. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175,
178 (1983) (describing the "social worker's reason" for public defender work).
23. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 29 (1981);
Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319 (1987);
see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Less Suffering When You're Warned: A Response to Pro-
fessor Lewis, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 871 (1989).
24. Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1259-61, 1277-80 (1998) [hereinafter Griffin, Legal Ethics].
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protected from disciplinary sanction or other penalty, when they
have a "good faith" religious basis for doing so.2 Professor Griffin
herself acknowledges the shortcomings of this approach, particu-
larly the difficulty of establishing and enforcing consistent gov-
erning standards, and thus prefers the "civil disobedience"
approach, in which the lawyer acts according to his religious beliefs
and suffers any consequent punishment from the profession and
the law.26 As a practical example of the latter approach, Professor
Griffin hypothesizes a scenario of a Catholic lawyer who discloses
her client's plan to kill someone.z7 As Professor Griffin describes
it, the lawyer is then professionally disciplined for revealing a client
confidence; publicity surrounding the penalty raises a public up-
roar, and the legislature changes the rule of client confidentiality to
include an exception for imminent bodily harm; the lawyer partici-
pates in drafting the new rule (though in doing so relies on Ameri-
can constitutional and common law traditions rather than Catholic
precepts); and subsequent theological debate results in a definitive
statement from the Pope endorsing the new rule.28 In Professor
Griffin's view, this scenario illustrates an appropriate resolution of
conflict between professional and religious imperatives - the "cor-
rective role" that religion can play in the legal profession.29
Model professional rules recognize that the prospect of death or
serious bodily harm to another allows a breach of client confidenti-
ality,3" and a sense of the gravity of Professor Griffin's factual
premise is widely shared.31 Applying the "civil disobedience" ap-
25. Id. at 1259-60.
26. Id. at 1260-61, 1277-79.
27. See id. at 1277-79.
28. See id. at 1278.
29. See id. at 1275.
30. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(1) ("A lawyer may reveal.., information [re-
lating to the representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A(1)(a) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) ("A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information
when and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent.., death
or serious bodily injury . . . .") (quoted in Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving
Exception to Confidentiality: Restating Law Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought
to Be, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1996) [hereinafter Freedman, The Life-Saving
Exception to Confidentiality]). Professor Griffin's argument is premised on the ab-
sence of such a provision. See Griffin, Legal Ethics, supra note 24, at 1277-8 n.80.
31. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on
Confidentiality, A Guilty Client, An Innocent Condemned Man, and An Ethics-Seeking
Defense Counsel, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1611 (1996) (arguing that it is reasonable to
disclose client confidences in extreme circumstances where otherwise irreparable in-
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proach to less compelling facts, however, such as revealing the lo-
cation of a murder victim's body to ease the suffering of the
victim's family,32 exposes three fundamental problems with the ap-
proach. Two of these problems - the ambiguity of religious teach-
ings and the role of legislation - will be addressed respectively in
the latter two sections of this Essay. The third problem, which is
the primary problem for the purposes of this Essay, is that the cli-
ent is completely forsaken in the "civil disobedience" scenario.
The client is, in fact, simply excluded from the analysis. The likely
consequences of the lawyer's "civil disobedience" for the client in-
clude criminal charges (or incriminating evidence on the pending
charges) and consequent punishment. Professor Griffin's civilly
disobedient lawyer thus becomes an informant against her client.33
The problem from the perspective of the client is one of notice
and choice. Professional rules require a lawyer to keep informa-
tion learned from a client confidential. 34 Clients know of this obli-
gation, or are informed of it the first time they meet with their
attorneys. As such, they rely on it when they speak with their at-
torneys.35 For an attorney then to breach that promise is nothing
jury to third party would occur); Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidenti-
ality, supra note 30, at 1631 (stating opinion that "human life should take precedence
over confidentiality"); Robert P. Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer's Moral
Duties With Life on the Line, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1641 (1996) [hereinafter Lawry,
Damned and Damnable] ("As current law and ethics rules stand, I hope a general
exception would be implied, allowing lawyers to make such a disclosure to save the
life of a wrongfully convicted person.").
32. This is the much-discussed "Lake Pleasant Bodies" case. See People v. Beige,
372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct.), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975);
see also Griffin, Legal Ethics, supra note 24, at 1280; Steven H. Hobbs, The Lawyer's
Duties of Confidentiality and Avoidance of Harm to Others: Lessons from Sunday
School, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1431, 1436-37 (1998) (noting that the Belge court wres-
tled with implications of balancing clients' constitutional protections "against the gen-
eral interests of society and the particular interests of the victim's families"); Lawry,
Damned and Damnable, supra note 31, at 1654-55 (arguing that lawyers in Beige case
were morally justified in keeping their silence).
33. The result is the same, of course, with disclosure to prevent death or serious
bodily harm. See also FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note
17, at 115-16 (consequences for criminal defendant upon disclosure of his perjury).
34. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6; see also MODEL RULES Preamble at 13 ("A law-
yer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except
so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.").
35. Not all clients, of course, divulge harmful information on the basis of this guar-
antee. Some withhold it out of mistrust or fear, or the belief that disclosing it might
temper the commitment of their attorney to fight for acquittal or dismissal of the
charges. Others freely incriminate themselves, to police officers as well as defense
counsel, in apparent ignorance of the rule.
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short of a betrayal of the client.36 Thus, in Professor Griffin's "civil
disobedience" scenario, religious values may triumph, society may
be bettered by a changed rule, and the lawyer herself may be vindi-
cated, but an unwitting human being has been sacrificed in the pro-
cess. The client had no notice that his reliance on the professional
code - the law - could be turned against him for the sake of
other interests, let alone that his own lawyer could do the turning.
And in the case of the indigent criminal defendant, the client had
no role in selecting the lawyer who then incriminated him. Though
this result is arguably justifiable if necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily harm to another, it is hardly justifiable (if at all)
otherwise.
Some scholars have proposed that attorneys disclose their reli-
gious or moral parameters to clients at the outset and secure the
clients' consent to those parameters before agreeing to represent
them.37 The option to request different counsel is not, however,
typically available to the criminal defendant who receives a court-
appointed lawyer.38 That lawyer herself therefore must be com-
mensurately limited in her ability to control the terms of the repre-
sentation. Scholars also endorse "morally counseling" clients
during the course of the representation, though they typically ad-
vise doing so only with caution and restraint.39 The possibility that
lawyer and client may not have shared values is all the greater with
36. For a less strident view, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious
Noncompliance, Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1307, 1311 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Lawyer Discipline] ("Given lawyers' par-
ticular duty 'to encourage respect for the law,' it might seem anomalous to allow law-
yers to opt out of the particular rules of professional conduct that they find offensive
on religious or moral grounds." (footnote omitted) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (1980) and MODEL RULES Preamble). But see
also Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 40-41 (1997) [hereinafter Green, Personal Values] (noting
that a lawyer's withdrawal from representation on the basis of a conflicting personal
belief "might reasonably be perceived [by the client] to be an act of betrayal").
37. See, e.g., Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Faith and the Attorney-Client Relationship: A
Muslim Perspective, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1998) [hereinafter al-Hibri,
Faith and the Attorney-Client Relationship]; Green, Personal Values, supra note 36, at
55; Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Shaffer's Suffering Client, Freedman's Suffering Lawyer, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 129 (1988).
38. See also Taylor, Alternating Visions, supra note 18, at 2440-41 (noting that
"consent . . .may be illusory" when given by the client of a public defender who
discloses a formal conflict of interest).
39. See, e.g., Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1469, 1495-99 (1998); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession,
and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 379-97
(1998); see also Green, Personal Values, supra note 36, at 41-52 (discussing appropri-
ate scope of and limitations on moral and religious counseling of clients).
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indigent criminal defendants, whose education and outlook typi-
cally differ radically from those of the attorney,4° and who may al-
ready question the fairness - the "morality" - of the
circumstances that underlie the criminal charges against them.
Moral counseling by a public defender thus could threaten the cli-
ent's trust, which is essential to the representation and difficult for
a court-appointed attorney to establish. It also could be coercive,41
or simply irrelevant.42 This means not that moral advice by a pub-
lic defender is forbidden,43 but that it should be dispensed, if at all,
only with extraordinary care.
Because of the unique circumstances of court-appointed counsel,
scholars who urge that attorneys' representation of clients and ad-
vice to them be more infused with religious and moral values often
temper the exhortation with respect to such counsel.4 4 The argu-
40. Cf Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 2, at 1283-84 (noting that most
law school graduates are white and of middle- to upper-class means); Cochran, supra
note 39, at 394-95 (discussing difficulty of moral discourse "across cultural bounda-
ries" and need for lawyer to be sensitive to differences in moral values).
41. See Lesnick, supra note 39, at 1498, 1499 (noting client's "vulnerabilities" and
the danger of oppression by the lawyer); Green, Personal Values, supra note 36, at 46-
47 (uninvited "theological dialogue" with client could be "abusive").
42. Moral or religious issues are possibly the last factors a public defender could
successfully urge a client to consider in deciding between, for instance, pleading guilty
and going to trial, or whether or not to impeach a truthful incriminating witness. Cf
Cochran, supra note 39, at 329 ("The client's interest in freedom may conflict with the
client's interest in forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience."). They may
also be the last issues about which the client wants to hear from his lawyer. Cf. B.
Carl Buice, Practicing Law to the Glory of God, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1027, 1032
(1996) ("People want different things from their priest and their lawyer."); Charles P.
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 6 (1951) ("The priest handles other
people's spiritual aspirations. A lawyer handles other people's troubles.").
43. Cf. MODEL RULES Rule 2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."); FREED-
MAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17, at 50-52, 57 (discussing law-
yer's duty of moral consultation with client).
44. See, e.g., Cochran, supra, note 39, at 393 (noting that in "morally counseling"
the client, "when the client has not chosen the lawyer or would have a difficult time
changing lawyers, the lawyer should be less directive"); Howard Lesnick, The Reli-
gious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1469, 1492 (1998) ("To
accept personal reasons for unwillingness [on the part of appointed criminal defense
counsel to undertake particular actions on behalf of clients], given the pervasive inad-
equacy of compensation and litigation support for criminal defense work, may well be
to step out onto a slippery slope .... ); Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9, 56-60 (1995) (considering the "greater risks" of "morally ac-
tivist lawyering" in "the poverty law setting," including the possibility that moral con-




ment is easily made explicit with respect to public defenders.
Criminal defendants, unlike parties in other legal matters, face the
deprivation of liberty or life. Constitutionally-mandated guaran-
tees - the right to trial, the right to counsel, the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence -
are reflected in special procedures and special leeway for counsel
in order to protect against the erroneous deprivation of life or lib-
erty. Indigent criminal defendants are uniquely disadvantaged in
the criminal justice system, as in society at large, and special care
must be taken to ensure that they receive the same protections as
criminal defendants of better means. Court-appointed counsel
must therefore be held rigorously to uniform standards of profes-
sional conduct in representing them.45
That a criminal prosecutor also is governed by special rules of
professional conduct strengthens the argument. Just as the relative
powerlessness of the criminal defendant entitles him to special pro-
cedural protections, and his attorney to special professional rules,
the power of the prosecutor binds her to special obligations. The
prosecutor must, for instance, disclose exculpatory information to
the defense.46 She also is enjoined from prosecuting charges she
knows are not supported by probable cause.47 And she must
"serve justice" rather than seek to "win."' 48 These special rules re-
flect fundamental societal values about how criminal laws should
be enforced, and embody a resolution of the often competing goals
of law enforcement and individual liberties. The juxtaposition of
the special rules for prosecutors and those for criminal defense
counsel reflects a careful balance between the state's power to
prosecute and punish and the individual's right to protect himself
against that power. For one side to act inconsistently with the rules
that govern it upsets that balance; to do so to the disadvantage of
the client it represents thus is to disserve both that client and soci-
ety, which has approved that balance.49 Moreover, each side ex-
45. See also David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, supra note 16, at
1756-57 (arguing that the problem with vesting "ethical discretion" in the criminal
defense lawyer is that "the temptations to offer only a minimal, perfunctory defense
are immense for the vast majority of the criminal bar").
46. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(d); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
47. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(a).
48. See FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17, at 214-15.
49. Cf. Green, Personal Values, supra note 36, at 59 ("[It could be argued that]
because the professional norms embody the professional community's understanding
of what it means to be a good lawyer, they are presumptively justified and worthy of
respect.") (footnotes omitted).
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pects the other side to represent its client in accordance with the
governing rules (as does the judge). For the criminal defense law-
yer to change the rules vis-A-vis only his client is to doubly disad-
vantage the client, by depriving the client of his lawful rights and
not working a commensurate change in the prosecutorial powers
that necessitate and justify those rights.
In other lawyer-client relationships, it may well be appropriate
for lawyers to take a more affirmative moral role in the representa-
tion and for religious values to inform this morality. Professor Al-
legretti's "covenantal model" is one proposal for such a lawyer-
client relationship. 0 For religion, morality or other considerations
to affect a lawyer's decision whether to represent a client in the
first place is, moreover, fully appropriate outside of the context of
court appointments. Just as a private physician may choose not to
treat a patient,51 a lawyer serving private interests may choose not
to serve a particular client or cause.52 Lawyers, public defenders
included, should also take moral responsibility for the clients and
causes they represent.53 Once a lawyer has agreed to represent an
individual, however, the lawyer cannot vary the terms of that rep-
resentation according to standards that are not shared by the client
or known to her and that are not reflected in rules of professional
conduct.54 This axiom only can be stronger when the lawyer acts as
50. Joseph G. Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective
on Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1116-29 (1998) (describing a
model connecting religious faith and legal practice).
51. See AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS I VI (1992) ("A physician shall...
be free to choose whom to serve .... "); AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Standard
8.10 (1992) ("Physicians are free to choose whom they will serve."); id. Standard 9.06
("[A] physician may decline to accept... [an] individual as a patient."); id. Standard
9.12 ("The creation of the physician-patent relationship is contractual in nature. Gen-
erally, both the physician and the patient are free to enter into or decline the relation-
ship."). But see id. Standard 9.12 ("[P]hysicians who offer their services to the public
may not decline to accept patients because of race, color, religion, national origin, or
any other basis that would constitute illegal discrimination.").
52. See FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17, at 49, 57;,
Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection and
Cooperation with Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1353-54 (1998); Green, Personal
Values, supra note 36, at 53.
53. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Religion is Not Totally Irrelevant to Legal Eth-
ics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1998) [hereinafter Freedman, Religion is Not
Totally Irrelevant] ("Lawyers are morally accountable. A lawyer can be 'called to
account' and is not beyond reproof for the decision to accept a particular client or
cause." (citing FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17,
at 71))
54. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17,
at 50, 71; Green, Lawyer Discipline, supra note 36, at 1311; Lesnick, supra note 39, at
1493-94 (calling this "[a] strong version" of the distinction between the attorney's
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an agent of the state - a public servant - in fulfilling an obliga-
tion the state has assumed, and the client does not choose who ful-
fills that obligation in representing him. For a public defender to
base his decisions in representing a client on anything other than
the client's legal interests and objectives would be both unprofes-
sional and immoral.
55
Indeed, in the tumult and hectic pace of the criminal courts, and
in light of the stakes involved and the high caseloads public defend-
ers typically carry, the public defender is perhaps most like an
emergency-room physician, whose duty is to treat all patients to
the best of her abilities regardless of both the circumstances that
brought them to the emergency room and the social or moral
ramifications of treating them. 6 An emergency-room physician
might well deplore those circumstances - an overdose from recre-
ational drug use, for instance, or gunshot wounds from an assault
instigated by the patient himself. The physician may also have reli-
gious objections, for instance to sexual behavior that is associated
with contracting HIV, or to specific medical procedures like abor-
tions or blood transfusions, but the patient's medical needs and
wishes govern. The emergency room is no place to try to change
society's mores or to stand on religious principle, and unwitting pa-
tients in need of care cannot be the pawns of such change or princi-
ple. Neither should poor people charged with crimes.57
III. Religious Views On The Work Of Public Defenders
Perhaps the most that can be said about religious views on the
work of public defenders is that they are equivocal. Scholarly com-
freedom to decide which clients to represent and his freedom to decide how to repre-
sent them).
55. Cf Marc D. Stern, The Attorney as Advocate and Adherent: Conflicting Obli-
gations of Zealousness, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1363, 1369 (1996) ("The religious attor-
ney may believe that the [client's] temporal advantage is a snare and a delusion, but it
is the client's consent and understanding of his or her own interests alone that em-
poivers the attorney to act. Anything more is a usurpation by the lawyer, and as to
which the attorney is an interloper."); Green, Personal Values, supra note 36, at 44
("[I]t would be improper for a lawyer to recommend a course of conduct [for the
client] when the lawyer's motivation is to promote the lawyer's unexpressed personal
views.").
56. See AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS VI (1992) (excepting "emergen-
cies" from physician's freedom to choose patients); AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS
Standard 8.11 (1992) ("[T]he physician should ... respond to the best of his or her
ability in cases of emergency where first aid treatment is essential.").
57. The emergency-room analogy also perhaps best captures Professor Freed-
man's compelling description of a client as someone who comes to a lawyer "because
he or she is suffering in some way or, at least, is trying to avoid suffering." Monroe H.
Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 331 (1987).
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mentary on Jewish and Christian perspectives on lawyering readily
illustrates this. In one view, for instance, though the Jewish tradi-
tion is "hostile" to a lawyer's adversarial role, Jewish principles of
equal justice for strangers and the poor support a Jewish lawyer's
"upholding the rule of [secular] law."'15  According to this view, a
Jewish lawyer may properly defend a client to the extent permitted
by governing secular law.59 The rules of professional conduct for
lawyers are, of course, part of that law. A competing view, how-
ever, prohibits a Jewish lawyer from assisting guilty clients, or dis-
tinguishes asserting technical or affirmative defenses from asserting
innocence and prohibits the latter.6 °
Christian interpretations are equally inconclusive. In one view,
secular laws are valid and binding only insofar as they are consis-
tent with "natural law" and moral standards.6' In another view,
Christian lawyers are permitted to use all means available under
governing secular laws to prevent the punishment of a guilty per-
son.62 In a combination of the viewpoints, the Christian criminal
defense lawyer is exhorted to seek all available procedural and
substantive protections on behalf of a client but must employ
"moral" means in doing so, and thus may not attack the truthful
witness.63
Islamic tradition too is open to interpretation. Islamic law is re-
plete with protections for the criminal defendant, and forgiving
58. Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1259,
1265, 1269 (1996).
59. See Michael J. Broyde, Practicing Criminal Law: A Jewish Law Analysis of
Being a Prosecutor or Defense Attorney, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1150-51 (1998).
60. See id. at 1147-49; see also Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 219, 270 (1995) [hereinafter Griffin, Dirty Hands] ("Jewish law recog-
nizes a presumption of innocence for the accused party, so the lawyer can assume that
her client is innocent and therefore worthy of defense. An admission of guilt, how-
ever, destroys the presumption of innocence and excludes the possibility of legal rep-
resentation for one who confesses to a crime." (citing BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH
ETHICS AND HALAKHA FOR OUR TIME 113-14 (1984))); Russell G. Pearce, To Save a
Life: Why a Rabbi and a Jewish Lawyer Must Disclose a Client Confidence, 29 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1771, 1772-76 (1996) (presenting opposing views derived from Jewish
tradition on disclosing client confidences).
61. See, e.g., Griffin, Dirty Hands, supra note 60, at 267-68.
62. See, e.g., Shaffer, Serve the Guilty, supra note 4, at 1033 ("I am entitled ... to
see to it that the legal engines of punishment operate according to their own rules -
one of which is that I am entitled to use the rules to avoid the punishment provided in
the rules."); see also Griffin, Dirty Hands, supra note 60, at 268 (lawyer not at fault for
defending guilty criminal since the "evil act" is already committed).
63. See Collett, supra note 52, at 1377 ("The intentional destruction of the reputa-
tion of the truthful witness, presentation of the perjurious client's testimony - these
means are forbidden for Christian lawyers.").
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rather than punishing the guilty is repeatedly stressed.64 At the
same time, Muslims are enjoined from aiding others in wrongdo-
ing,65 and not all individuals enjoy the same degree of procedural
protection. 66 Thus, in Islam, as in other religions, even the most
basic tenets can lead to opposite conclusions about the propriety of
specific actions on behalf of a client.
67
The conclusion reached by Professor Freedman is therefore ines-
capable: serving one's client within the parameters of the adver-
sary system may very well be "the essence of religion . . . [and]
justice. ' 68 As Professor Freedman succinctly points out, "religion"
does not tell us whether, or when, its injunctions to aid those in
need and keep confidences are trumped, or even contradicted to
begin with, by its exhortations to respect human life and strive for
"justice. ' 69 The most "religious" course of conduct for a public de-
fender is thus arguably to do precisely what the law and the profes-
sional rules allow and exhort him to do, which is also precisely
what the judge, prosecutor, society, and, most importantly, the cli-
ent expect him to do. The lawyer who is not comfortable doing so,
for religious reasons or others, should not be a public defender.
IV. How Religion Should Influence the Work of a
Public Defender
That religious considerations should not alter a public defender's
representation of a client to the legal detriment of the client does
not mean that religion has no role in the public defender's work.
Religious imperatives and exhortations may well sustain and in-
64. See, e.g., Awad, supra note 5, at 94-99 (discussing presumption of innocence,
right to indictment, right to present defense, limitations on search and seizure and
interrogation, and rights to notice and opportunity to be heard); Qur'an, v:34 (remit-
ting punishment for armed robbers who repent); id. at v:39 (same for thieves); id. at
xxiv:5 (false accusers); id. at xxv:70 (idolaters, murderers and adulterers).
*65. See, e.g., Qur'an v:2 ("Help ye one another [uin righteousness and piety, [b]ut
help ye not one another in sin and rancor.").
66. See, e.g., Awad, supra note 5, at 100-01 (delineating categories of accused indi-
viduals on the basis of known "character" and differing procedural protections for
each category).
67. See also al-Hibri, Faith and the Attorney-Client Relationship, supra note 37, at
1136 (discussing difficulty of client-centered representation in light of Islamic obliga-
tion to strive for justice); Azizah al-Hibri, The Muslim Perspective on the Clergy-Peni-
tent Privilege, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1723, 1725, 1730-31 (1996) (discussing Qur'anic
injunctions not to betray trusts and confidences and limitations on those injunctions
for greater social good); id. at 1732 (discussing duty of Muslims to abide by governing
secular laws or work to change them).
68. Freedman, Religion is Not Totally Irrelevant, supra note 53, at 1299.
69. Id. at 1300-01.
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spire a public defender in his work, and help him to treat clients
with the compassion and dignity many feel is necessary to repre-
senting indigent criminal defendants.7 ° Compassion and a sense of
dignity are often the only benefits indigent criminal defendants re-
ceive from their representation, and the public defender is almost
as often the sole provider of those benefits. Also, religion can mo-
tivate a public defender to transcend the immediate legal exigen-
cies of his clients and provide assistance beyond that required by
the pending charges and the professional rules.71
In addition, religion can shape the work of the public defender
by influencing changes in the professional rules themselves. 72 Pro-
fessor Freedman's campaign to create an exception to client confi-
dentiality when necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury
is a model for such change, though its ground was not explicitly
religious.73 And religious perspectives can inform change in the
criminal justice system itself, for instance by stimulating legislative
reform to shift the emphasis from retribution and punishment to
forgiveness and healing. The "restorative justice" movement pro-
vides one model for such reform, in its focus on healing for victims,
70. See Abbe Smith and William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, __
MERCER L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1999) (detailing Jewish and Christian precedent
for public defender work); Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspec-
tive, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131 (1996) [hereinafter Freedman, Jewish Perspective]
(discussing Jewish precedent and inspiration for compassion toward clients and zeal
on their behalf); Shaffer, Serve the Guilty?, supra note 4, at 1027-29 (discussing Bibli-
cal inspiration for serving the guilty and "the repulsive"); Griffin, Legal Ethics, supra
note 24, at 1258-59 (listing various possible motivations religion can provide for
lawyers).
71. Cf. Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zeal-
ous Representation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97, 108-09 (1995) ("Why
shouldn't we advocate that in the poverty area, zealous representation means provid-
ing holistic assistance to the client?") (suggesting, as example, affirmative obligation
to refer alcoholic client charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to treat-
ment) (footnote omitted).
72. See Griffin, Legal Ethics, supra, note 24, at 1265-67, 1273; Thomas D. Morgan,
The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work - Legal Ethics: A Response to Profes-
sor Griffin, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1315-19 (1998) (discussing interplay between
religious and professional ethics).
73. See Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality, supra note 31;
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 17, at 102-03, 165; Mor-
gan, supra note 72, at 1315 ("I believe a source of Professor Freedman's motivation
was theological, and while I do not recall him making an explicit appeal to Jewish
tradition, I do not understand his failure to do so to have been other than a rhetorical
choice.") (footnote omitted); see also Freedman, Jewish Perspective, supra note 70, at
1136-37 ("I have written extensively for thirty years about the need to change the
existing [professional] rules to conform with the constitutional and religious ideals
that I believe in. One of many examples is the rule that forbids a lawyer to reveal a
confidence in order to save an innocent human life.").
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reconciling victims and offenders, and reintegrating offenders into
the community."4 Criminal laws and enforcement policies that dis-
parately burden certain segments of the population can also be at-
tacked, community religious institutions can be strengthened to
prevent crime at its roots, and spiritual and other counseling can be
made available to clients as a supplement to their legal representa-
tion. With his unique combination of legal training, firsthand
knowledge and divine inspiration, the religious public defender is
ideally situated to launch such initiatives. The legislature, profes-
sional rules committee, bar associations and religious and commu-
nity organizations-all serve as appropriate venues for a public
defender to act on religious beliefs that he feels compel a change in
the dictates of defending the indigent accused. The specific case of
any one client is not such a venue.
Conclusion
Perhaps more so than other lawyers, the religious public de-
fender must be "schizophrenic," separating his professional obliga-
tions from his religious commitments.75  Having accepted the
responsibility of representing indigent criminal defendants, the
public defender is duty-bound to draw a line between the mandates
of that responsibility and competing religious obligations. For this
reason, some might conclude that the work of public defenders-is
immoral per se. Others might argue that the immorality lies with
the adversary system, or the motivations that underlie it.76 As this
Essay has attempted to show, "religion" can support or defeat any
one of these propositions. Whatever answer he chooses, the public
defender must remain faithful to his client.
74. See generally Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, RESTORING JUS-
TICE (1997); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES (1990).
75. See Stern, supra note 55, at 1370.
76. Cf. Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, supra note 45, at 1755 ("[I]t is
inherent in the defender's role that its duties will deviate to at least some degree from
common moral requirements not to assist wrongdoers or aid in frustrating legitimate
social efforts to control them. The defender's morality will inevitably deviate from
common morality, perhaps even conflict with common morality.... "); Wasserstrom,
supra note 15, at 12 (noting that "the amoral behavior of the criminal defense lawyer
is justifiable" given the threat the state poses to the criminal defendant).
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